Chapter 7.3
Logistic Information Systems
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Table of contents Paragraph |
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2 Policy on the use of Logistic Information Systems (LIS)
3.5 Redundancy/reversionary mode
3.6 Automatic arising management
4.1 Minimum Data Capture Lists (MDCL)
4.2 Initial guidance from Integrated Project Team (IPT)
For the purpose of this chapter, a Logistic Information System (LIS) is defined as any electronic information system that allows the management, planning and detailed co-ordination of logistic operations within the Military Air Environment (MAE). The system may host administrative, financial, asset management and maintenance functionality or any combination of these functions.
This chapter is applicable to the MAE.
2 Policy on the use of Logistic Information Systems (LIS)
The aircraft/equipment Integrated Project Team Leader (IPTL) is ultimately responsible for any item of hardware or software used for the operation and/or maintenance of the IPT’s equipment. IPTLs utilizing an LIS are therefore responsible for ensuring its compliance with the policy in this chapter; this applies even if the LIS is used by multiple platforms. An LIS is to interface with other Information Systems (IS) as required and is to be capable of use in all environments in which the equipment it supports will be expected to operate.
The LIS is to complement the safety, airworthiness and operability, alongside platform maintenance and support activity, of aircraft and associated equipments, whilst exploiting technology to minimize, where possible, the maintenance burden. Preliminary Hazard Listing will identify hazards related to the use of the LIS. Furthermore, utilization of an appropriate Safety Management System (SMS) will facilitate rigorous testing to ensure that safety-relevant business data is not corrupted or incorrectly manipulated: the test results are to complement the aircraft safety case. The LIS application should be permissive for multiple levels of user authorizations. When in-built business procedures are contravened, the system must warn the user and prevent further processing. However, the system should allow users, 4in the Forward environment only and3with the appropriate authorization, set by the aircraft/equipment IPT, to over-ride such procedures if dictated by the operational 4situation3. When the warning is over-ridden, this action is to be recorded against the individual who certifies the over-ride.
Generic details relating to IS security can be found in JSP 440. For LIS, generic ‘log-ons’ are allowed, but each certifiable action is to be attributable to the individual carrying it out. This is normally achieved through a Personal Identification Device/Personal Identification Number system as detailed in Chapter 7.3.1. Security accreditation is a mandatory requirement for all Information Technology (IT)-based systems that electronically store, process or forward official information. JSP 440 contains details of the security accreditation process and where advice can be obtained.
The LIS’s configuration is to be managed by the aircraft/equipment IPT. Where the in-service airworthiness and safety of the aircraft/equipment is managed by an LIS, the LIS is to be maintained in accordance with an SMS that includes auditing, fault reporting and recording at all maintenance levels. This is to include any updates to airworthiness-relevant procedures or information. Historical information is to be retained so that, through the date-time stamp, the policy, regulations and software version in use at the time of any safety certification can be identified.
The electronic certification of maintenance is detailed in Chapter 7.3.1.
An LIS should present information to the user in a clear, unambiguous and logical manner, conforming where possible to corporate or application ‘common look and feel’. As a general principle, the system should initially display the minimum amount of information required by the user to complete a specific task, with the ability to easily interrogate the database should more detailed information be required. When information is output for further processing in paper form, CASD Pol 2 is to approve the MOD Format in accordance with Chapter 7.2.1.
3.5 Redundancy/reversionary mode
An LIS that is being relied upon to provide airworthiness information is to be designed such that it has sufficient redundancy to allow the system to remain operational and ensure continuity and assurance of flight safety and airworthiness in the event of catastrophic LIS failure. The IPTL is to ensure that his system has sufficient redundancy to meet the above criteria. For LIS where availability is critical to the operational/legal ability to carry out the next aircraft flight/sortie, a minimum of 3 levels of redundancy is requiredto ensure that, in the event of a failure, the LIS will still be able to operate as specified and still have one further level of redundancy. Paper backup is not considered as a level of redundancy.
3.6 Automatic arising management
The aircraft/equipment IPT is to detail and document the criteria and procedures for automatic arising management (eg voltage drops during engine start or high main rotor speed during autorotation). The policy for Management of Arisings is at Chapter 7.3.3.
Where an LIS is used via portable IT, it is the responsibility of the aircraft/equipment IPT to ensure that the IT is suitable and approved for use on or around the intended aircraft/equipment. Advice should be sought from the Head of Test Equipment Procurement Organisation (TEPO), RAF Brampton, 95331 Ext 6046.
Control of data is essential to the integrity and airworthiness of both LIS and the aircraft/equipment they support. Unless specified, the data will remain under the control of the aircraft/equipment IPT, with all requests for changes to datasets being co-ordinated by that IPT’s fleet managers. Further information can be found in Chapter 12.8.
4.1 Minimum Data Capture Lists (MDCL)
An MDCL is a list of parameters/metrics that are to be captured by platform IPTs that utilize an LIS. The IPTL in consultation with CASD Pol 2 is to determine the policy as to what constitutes an MDCL for a particular platform. The platform IPTL is to determine the specific parameters/metrics required to be captured to ensure the airworthiness of the platform design and to carry out the various roles expected of the platform, with CASD Pol 2 acting as the authority on information to be captured for the MOD Form 700C. If a new platform is to utilize an existing LIS, early engagement with the LIS sponsor is required to ensure that the capability exists to capture all the relevant parameters/metrics. The IPTL is ultimately responsible for the extent of the parameters/metrics identified within the MDCL.
4.2 Initial guidance from Integrated Project Team (IPT)
Clear procedures for data management are to be provided by the aircraft/equipment IPT and considered procedurally within the SMS.
Only personnel authorized by the aircraft/equipment IPT are to have access to the system business/reference data. Changes to business/reference data are to be approved and certified by either the generic LIS sponsor or an individual approved by the associated platform IPTL. Furthermore, the IPT authority for change should be recorded against the action in order to maintain a full audit trail.
4.4.1 Prior to use on LIS
Prior to the use of an asset within an LIS environment, details of the asset's usage, configuration, build, scheduled maintenance requirements and condition are to be recorded on the LIS to create an Electronic Service Record (ESR) for the asset. Additionally, when an asset previously recorded on the LIS returns to the LIS environment (having been outside the LIS environment), the ESR for the asset on the LIS is to be updated prior to its use.
4.4.2 Preservation of data integrity
The system should automatically detect and prevent duplication of assets on the system. This may need to be supported by business processes to cover deployed Sqns/Units that may not have access to, or have been provided with, ‘live’ asset data. However, local input of asset data by authorized personnel is to be permitted, to allow for the creation, modification or change of function of an asset, eg re-handing of an undercarriage assembly.
4.4.3 Asset maintenance outside LIS boundary
Aircraft/equipment that have been registered on an LIS may be maintained outside the system’s boundary, eg whilst allotted to a Depth non-LIS contractor for any form of maintenance. In these instances, arrangements are to be made for data relating to LIS-pertinent maintenance activities to be captured and fed back to the LIS in order to maintain the currency of the LIS database.
Stns/Ships/Units are to adopt one of the following 2 time zone options:
1 The time zone is to be included on all maintenance documentation. The authority to use local time zones on an LIS system is to be approved by the IPTL or designated member of the IPT.
2 All recorded times are to be in Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time), unless local requirements dictate otherwise.
Aircraft/equipment IPTs are to use the generic fault codes detailed in JAP(D) 100C-02.
The aircraft/equipment IPT is to mandate the archiving policy for data used by the LIS. The IPTL is to ensure that the following criteria are met:
1 As a minimum, data selected by the aircraft/equipment IPT is to be archived in accordance with the current paperwork retention periods listed in Chapter 7.6.
2 The frequency and methods of archiving are to be mandated by the aircraft/equipment IPT to maximize the performance of the LIS whilst maintaining availability of essential data.
3 An LIS is to be able to retrieve archived data within the timescale specified by the aircraft/equipment IPT. Therefore, if the LIS application is amended such that it can no longer retrieve/process archived data, that version of the LIS application in use at the time of amendment is also to be archived to allow future retrieval.
An aircraft/equipment IPTL utilizing a bespoke LIS is responsible for the ultimate approval and assurance of any current or future capability delivered by the LIS and its development with the contractor.
Support IPTs maintaining a generic LIS for a broad spectrum of aircraft are responsible for the assurance and approval of any current or future capability delivered by the LIS and its development contractor. The utilization of a generic LIS is an IPTL decision and therefore the ultimate responsibility for airworthiness lies with the IPTL.
The integrity and assurance of electronic data transferred between a military-controlled LIS and a contractor-controlled LIS is the responsibility of the aircraft/equipment IPTL. The IPTL is to ensure that data made available to the contractor from a military LIS is of an acceptable format to enable the contractor to meet his maintenance responsibilities. The IPTL is also responsible for ensuring that data received from a contractor's LIS is capable of being accurately transferred to a military LIS.
This chapter refers to the following publications:
1 JSP 440 – The Defence Manual of Security. http://www.defence.mod.uk/jsp400-700/jsp440/JSP440.htm
2 JAP(D) 100C-02 – MOD Fault Reporting Documentation - Compilation Guidelines.